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Abstract
We present new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional Shapley value, a weighted
TU-value with the worths of the singletons as weights. The presented characterizations
are proportional counterparts to the famous characterizations of the Shapley value by
Shapley (1953b) and Young (1985a). We introduce two new axioms, called proportionality
and player splitting respectively. Each of them makes a main difference between the
proportional Shapley value and the Shapley value. If the stand-alone worths are plausible
weights, the proportional Shapley value is a convincing alternative to the Shapley value,
for example in cost allocation. Especially the player splitting property, which states that
the players’ payoffs do not change if another player splits into two new players who have
the same impact to the game as the original player, justifies the use of the proportional
Shapley value in many economic situations.
Keywords Cost allocation · Dividends · Proportional Shapley value · (Weighted)
Shapley value · Proportionality · Player splitting
1. Introduction
In contrast to Thomas (1969, 1974), who asserts that all cost allocation methods are
arbitrary and no one allocation scheme can be defended against all others, we have on the
one hand a large group of economists which prefers traditional cost accounting practices.
On the other hand, there exists a small group of economists and academics which prefers
cost allocation based on solutions to cooperative games with transferable utility dominated
by the Shapley value, e. g. Shubik (1962), Spinetto (1975), Roth and Verrecchia (1979),
Young (1985a), Young (1985b) and Leng and Parlar (2009). Moriarity (1975) states
”A proposal for a new allocation procedure can be justified only on the basis
of the advantages of the proposed method over existing methods.”
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2An empirical study by Barton (1988) shows a dramatic preference for the proportional
solution, called Moriarity’s method (Moriarity, 1975), also known as proportional rule,
compared to the nucleolus or the Shapley value. Banker (1981) uses an axiomatic ap-
proach. He further analyzed some shortcomings of the Shapley value in cost allocation,
especially the additivity axiom is considered questionable. It renders the allocation sen-
sitive to the way cost centers are used or organized. Banker shows in an example that
the allocations can differ significantly if two cost centers are merged and considered as
a single entry. His own proposal for an axiomatization in the context of cost allocation
contains a splitting axiom instead of additivity. It turns out that the unique value of his
axiomatization is identical with the proportional rule (Moriarity, 1975).
In contrast, some other authors stress the disadvantages of the proportional rule and
suggest the Shapley value. For example, Amer et al. (2007) criticize the restricted domain
of the proportional rule, the lack of additivity, a doubly discriminatory level and that it
does not take into account most of the marginal contributions.
The last point of criticism is avoided by the proper Shapley values (Brink et al., 2015)
or the proportional value, developed by Ortmann (2000) and Feldman (1999) simulta-
neously. Feldman also suggests his value to cost allocation, gives a short overview of
proportional cost allocation and points to Gangolly (1981) who introduced a new cost
allocation scheme, denoted as ”Independent Cost Proportional Scheme (ICPS)”. In this
scheme, Gangolly used a (proportional) weighted Shapley value for each given coalition
function v, where the weights are the worths of the singletons v({i}) for every player i.
Yet a general formalization as a TU-value and an axiomatic characterization were still
missing. Independently there was a ”rediscovery” of this value by Besner (2016) and Be´al
et al. (2018). Both denote their non-linear TU-value ”proportional Shapley value” and
give an axiomatization by efficiency and proportional balanced contributions, in spirit
to the axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values with weighted balanced contribu-
tions (Myerson, 1980; Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989). In addition, they point out that the
proportional Shapley value inherits many of the properties of the weighted Shapley val-
ues. Besner (2016) offers some extensions of the proportional Shapley value, for example
to graphs and level structures. Be´al et al. (2018) introduce a potential and give some
comparable axiomatizations to the Shapley value and economic applications.
The aim of this paper is to establish the proportional Shapley value as an application-
relevant allocation scheme, where there are asymmetries that are included exclusively in
the underlying game and not in exogenously given weights. Two new axioms make a main
difference to the Shapley value. The first one, called proportionality, is a proportional
counterpart to symmetry: the payoffs to two weakly dependent players, i. e., the marginal
contribution of one of these players to any coalition which contains only one of both players
is only his singleton worth, are proportional to the singleton worths of each other. Nowak
and Radzik (1995) give a similar axiom for the weighted Shapley values, called ω-mutual
dependence. The second axiom, called player splitting, is related to Banker (1981). If
a player splits into two new players, the payoff to unconcerned players does not change
under the condition that the new players contribute together the same to the game as
the original player. Radzik (2012) presents a similar idea in the opposite direction by his
amalgamating payoffs axiom: players who build a partnership (Kalai and Samet, 1987)
amalgamate to a new player. Our two new axioms enable axiomatic characterizations
which are proportional counterparts to the famous characterizations of the Shapley value
3by Shapley (1953b) and Young (1985a).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries. As the main
results, we offer in Section 3 an axiomatization which is close to the axiomatization of
the Shapley value by Shapley (1953b), in Section 4 we present an axiomatization which
is close to the axiomatization by Young (1985a) and in Section 6 we introduce the player
splitting property which leads to two axiomatizations as corollaries. In between, in Section
5 examples illustrate the proportional Shapley value in the context of cost allocation,
motivate the player splitting property and show an inconsistency of the Shapley value
in this case. Section 7 gives a short conclusion. All the proofs, related lemmas, and the
logical independence of the axioms used for characterization are relegated to the appendix
(Section 8).
2. Preliminaries
We denote by R the real numbers and by Q the rational numbers. Let U an infinite set,
the universe of all players. We denote by N the set of all finite subsets of U. A cooperative
game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v) consisting of a set of players
N ∈ N and a coalition function v ∈ {f : 2N → R | f(∅) = 0} where 2N is the power set
of N . We refer to a TU-game also only by v. The subsets S ⊆ N are called coalitions
and v(S) is called the worth of coalition S.
Let N ∈ N . The set of all TU-games with player set N is denoted by GN, if the worths
of the singletons must all be positive real numbers or must all be negative real numbers we
denote this set by GN0 := {v ∈ GN: v({i}) > 0 for all i ∈ N or v({i}) < 0 for all i ∈ N}, if
the worths of the singletons must all be positive rational numbers or must all be negative
rational numbers we mark this set by GN0Q := {v ∈ GN0 : v({i}) ∈ Q for all i ∈ N}.
A TU-value on GN (respectively on subdomains of GN) is an operator ϕ, that assigns
to any v ∈ GN (respectively v is an element of a subdomain of GN) a payoff vector
ϕ(N, v) ∈ RN (or ϕ(v) for short), with the meaning that ϕi(v) is the payoff to player i in
the TU-game v.
Let v ∈ GN and S ⊆ N . We denote by (S, v) the restriction of (N, v) to the player
set S. The Harsanyi dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) are defined inductively by
∆v(S) =
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), if |S| ≥ 1, and
0 if S = ∅. (1)
Another well-known formula of the dividends is given for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, by
∆v(S) =
∑
R⊆S
(−1)|S|−|R|v(R). (2)
The marginal contribution MCvi (S) of player i ∈ N to S ⊆ N\{i} is given by
MCvi (S) := v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). We call a coalition S ⊆ N active in v if ∆v(S) 6= 0.
Player i ∈ N is a dummy player in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}), i /∈ S, S ⊆ N,
or equivalent as a well-known fact, if ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = 0 for all S ⊆ N\{i}, S 6= ∅. If in
addition v({i}) = 0, then i is called a null player; players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are called
symmetric in v, if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all coalitions S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
4In many applications, the assumption of symmetry of the players is not realistic, e. g.
if the bargaining power or the amount of used venture capital are different. Shapley
(1953a) introduced for this case the (positive) weighted Shapley values1. We denote by
RN++ := {x ∈ RN : xi > 0 for all i ∈ N} the set of all vectors x ∈ RN where all coordinates
xi are positive. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN , and a vector ω ∈ RN++ of positive weights ωi for
all i ∈ N , the (positive) weighted Shapley value Shω (Shapley, 1953a) is defined by
Shωi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
ωi∑
j∈S ωj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
The next value distributes the dividends equally among all players in a coalition: for all
N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, the Shapley value Sh (Shapley, 1953b) is defined by
Shi(v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
We see that the Shapley value is a weighted Shapley value where all weights are equal. The
following value distributes the dividends proportionally to the singleton worths among all
players in a coalition. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN0 , the proportional Shapley value Shp
(Gangolly, 1981; Besner, 2016; Be´al et al., 2018) is given by
Shpi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N. (3)
Let ϕ be a TU-value on GN. We refer to some standard axioms. The first one assures
that the sum of all payoffs equals the worth of the grand coalition: distributing less than
v(N) is not efficient and distributing more than v(N) is not feasible.
Efficiency, E. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(v) = v(N).
The second axiom requires that a player whose marginal contribution is null with respect
to every coalition receives a null payoff.
Null player. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, and i ∈ N such that i is a null player in v, we have
ϕi(v) = 0.
The third axiom is a stronger version of the null player property. It states that a player
who only contributes his own worth to every coalition is getting a payoff of his singleton
worth.
Dummy, D. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, and i ∈ N such that i is a dummy player in v, we
have ϕi(v) = v({i}).
The next axiom states that a player’s payoff depends only on her marginal contributions.
Marginality, M. For all N ∈ N , v, v′ ∈ GN, and i ∈ N such that MCvi (S) = MCv′i (S)
for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have ϕi(v) = ϕi(v′).
1We desist from possibly null weights as by Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987).
5Additivity requires that a TU-value applied to the sum of two TU-games gives the same
payoff vector as the sum of the two payoff vectors obtained when applying the TU-value
to each of the two TU-games.
Additivity, A. For all N ∈ N , v, v′ ∈ GN, we have ϕ(v) + ϕ(v′) = ϕ(v + v′).
The symmetry axiom assures that equals should be treated equally.
Symmetry, S. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN, i, j ∈ N such that i and j are symmetric in v,
we have ϕi(v) = ϕj(v).
In the case of using a subdomain in the following sections, an axiom is required to hold
whenever a game belongs to the subdomain.
3. A characterization similar to Shapley
Nowak and Radzik (1995) have used for axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley val-
ues, also in the spirit of Shapley (1953b) and Young (1985a), an axiom called ω-mutual
dependence. There are, in contrast to our following definition, the singleton worths of
dependent players zero.
Definition 3.1. Let v ∈ GN. Two players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are called weakly dependent
in v if v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}), k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
This definition has the interpretation that a player is only interested to join a coalition
which contents weakly dependent players if all weakly dependent players are in the joined
coalition. So all weakly dependent players are in mutual dependence.
Lemma 3.2. Players i, j ∈ N are weakly dependent in v ∈ GN, iff ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0,
k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}, S 6= ∅.
With Definition 3.1 for weakly dependent players, we obtain a proportional property,
comparable to symmetry: the payoffs to two weakly dependent players are in the same
proportion as their singleton weights.
Proportionality, P. For all N ∈ N , v ∈ GN0 , i, j ∈ N such that i and j are weakly
dependent in v, we have
ϕi(v)
v({i}) =
ϕj(v)
v({j}) .
In Shapley (1953b) are formulated desirable properties for a TU-value by his well-known
three axioms, which can be represented by the four axioms of efficiency, null player,
symmetry and additivity, where the null player property can be replaced by the dummy
player property. But it is not appropriate to claim additivity in the case of a proportional
value because additivity is not even satisfied in the two-player case (see Huettner (2015),
page 282). So we use an axiom of additivity where in each game the stand-alone worths
of all players are in the same proportion.
Weak additivity, WA. For all N ∈ N , v, w ∈ GN, w({i}) = c · v({i}) for all i ∈ N ,
c > 0, we have
ϕ(v) + ϕ(w) = ϕ(v + w).
6It follows a characterization close to the original by Shapley (1953b).
Theorem 3.3. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0 . Shp is the unique TU-value that satisfies E, D,
P, and WA.
4. A characterization similar to Young
One of the most elegant characterizations of the Shapley value is suggested by Young
(1985a). In addition to efficiency and symmetry, Young used marginality2. To characterize
the proportional Shapley value we weaken marginality:
Weak marginality, WM. For all N ∈ N , v, w ∈ GN, w({j}) = v({j}) for all j ∈ N ,
and i ∈ N such that MCvi (S) = MCwi (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have
ϕi(v) = ϕi(w).
By this axiom, if the stand-alone worths of all players are given, the payoff to a player
depends only on his own marginal contributions. Chun (1989) introduced the coalitional
strategic equivalence axiom and Chun (1991) offers another appealing axiomatization of
the Shapley value, using efficiency, symmetry and coalitional strategic equivalence, itself
a generalization of strategic equivalence from von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
But by Casajus and Huettner (2008) is shown that coalitional strategic equivalence and
marginality are equivalent. Our next axiom weakens coalitional strategic equivalence.
Weak coalitional strategic equivalence, WCSE. For all N ∈ N , v, w ∈ GN such
that for any coalition R ⊆ N, |R| ≥ 2, c ∈ R, and all coalitions S ⊆ N ,
v(S) =
{
w(S) + c, if S ⊇ R,
w(S), if S + R,
(4)
we have ϕi(v) = ϕi(w) for all i ∈ N\R.
If the members of a coalition R are improving their cooperation and take this improvement
into all supersets of R, the payoff to all non-members of R does not change. The same
applies to all players outside of R if the cooperation within R has got worse and this trend
has continued in all supersets of R by the same amount. Unlike our axiom, in coalitional
strategic equivalence from Chun, there are also admitted singletons for the coalition R,
in strategic equivalence from Neumann and Morgenstern only singletons.
We show, analog to Casajus and Huettner (2008):
Proposition 4.1. WM is equivalent to WCSE.
We obtain a proportional counterpart to the axiomatization by Young (1985a).
Theorem 4.2. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0 . Shp is the unique TU-value that satisfies E, P
and WM/WCSE (equivalent by Proposition 4.1).
2Originally Young used an axiom called strong monotonicity. Chun (1989) named the essential part of
this axiom for the proof of the uniqueness marginality.
75. Examples
This section demonstrates the advantages of using the proportional Shapley value in cost
allocation. It confirms the proportionality property and illustrates the player splitting
property of the proportional Shapley value, presented in Section 6.
5.1. City 1
Assume that three districts of a city, district A, B, and C, wish to get a motorway ring.
In Fig. 1 the lengths of the motorway sections are given in kilometers. The offer of the
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Figure 1: City with three districts and a motorway ring (lengths in km).
road-building company with the most favorable prices (in millions of monetary units) is
given by
p(`) =

100`, for 0 ≤ ` < 20,
100`− 100, for 20 ≤ ` < 32,
100`− 200, for 32 ≤ `,
where ` is the length in kilometers. To share the building costs, we can establish a cost
game v on N = {1, 2, 3} with players 1 := A, 2 := B, 3 := C, where the worth of a
coalition S ⊆ N is the cost of the coalition S (in millions of monetary units). We get
v({1}) = 1300, v(2) = 1200, v(3) = 1100,
v({1, 2}) = 2400, v({1, 3}) = 2300, v({2, 3}) = 2200,
v({1, 2, 3}) = 3400.
The three districts have the problem, how to share the costs in the game v.
5.2. City 2
We modify city 1 to city 2 (Fig. 2).
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Figure 2: City with four districts and a motorway ring (lengths in km).
District C is split in two districts C1 and C2. We get a new coalition function v
′ on
N = {1, 2, 31, 32} with players 1 := A, 2 := B, 31 := C1, 32 := C2, given by
v′({1}) = 1300, v′(2) = 1200, v′(31) = 500,
v′(32) = 600, v′({1, 2}) = 2400, v′({1, 31}) = 1800,
v′({1, 32}) = 1900, v′({2, 31}) = 1700, v′({2, 32}) = 1800,
v′({31, 32}) = 1100, v′({1, 2, 31}) = 2900, v′({1, 2, 32}) = 3000,
v′({1, 31, 32}) = 2300, v′({2, 31, 32}) = 2200, v′({1, 2, 31, 32}) = 3400.
Here is a special kind of ”dependency” between player 31 and 32:
• The sum of the singleton worths from player 31 and 32 in v′ is equal to the worth of
player 3 in the game v.
• The marginal contributions of player 31 or player 32 to any coalition which does not
contain the respective other player are only the singleton worths of these players. So
the players 31 and 32 are weakly dependent in v
′.
• All coalitions which conclude both players 31 and 32 have the same worth in v′ as the
related coalitions in v which content the player 3.
• Coalitions which are the same in v and v′ have the same worth in v and v′.
Overall, there is no effect on the other players by splitting player 3 into two new players
31 and 32. Hence, we call a value consistent for splitting in a game v if in a corresponding
game v′, fulfilling the same conditions as here (we will formulate these conditions in
Definition 6.1), the payoff to not split players does not change.
We get with the Shapley value in the game v
Sh1(v) = 1233.33, Sh2(v) = 1133.33, Sh3(v) = 1033.33.
In the game v′ we obtain
Sh1(v
′) = 1241.67, Sh2(v′) = 1141.67, Sh31(v
′) = 458.33, Sh32(v
′) = 558.33.
9The total cost saving of cooperating is 200 million in each game. District C saves in the
game v 66.67 million (one-third of the total saving) and district C1 and district C2 save
together in the game v′ 83,34 million (42% of the total saving), although district C owns
only 31% of the length of the motorway. So there is, additional to the inconsistency, also
a discriminatory level of players which have a greater share of costs.
On the contrary, we get with the proportional Shapley value in the game v
Shp1(v) = 1229.94, Sh
p
2(v) = 1133.16, Sh
p
3(v) = 1036.90
and in the game v′
Shp1(v
′) = 1229.94, Shp2(v
′) = 1133.16, Shp31(v
′) = 471.32, Shp32(v
′) = 565.58.
Districts A and B have in both games the same costs and district C saves the same as
districts C1 and C2 together, 32% of the total cost saving. The proportional Shapley
value is then consistent for splitting in our sense, what we will show in general in the
following subsection. In addition, this result confirms the proportionality property of the
proportional Shapley value which gives the key difference in theorem 3.3 and theorem
4.2 to the related axiomatizations of the Shapley value: the players 31 and 32 are weakly
dependent in v′ and we have
Shp31(v
′)
v′({31}) =
Shp32(v
′)
v′({32}) .
6. Player Splitting
In many applications, it is not desired that the players’ payoffs change if another player
splits into several new players, which together have only the same input to the game as the
original splitting player, like in subsection 5.2 in our examples. We define a corresponding
game to a TU-game where a player of the original game is ”split” in two new players:
Definition 6.1. Let N,N j ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ GN, (N j, vj) ∈ GNj, j ∈ N, k, ` ∈ N j, k, ` /∈
N, N j = (N\{j}) ∪ {k, `}. The game (N j, vj) is called a corresponding split player
game3 to (N, v) if for all S ⊆ N\{j}
• vj({k}) + vj({`}) = v({j}),
• vj(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + vj({i}), i ∈ {k, `},
• vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = v(S ∪ {j}), and
• vj(S) = v(S).
It should be observed that players k, ` are weakly dependent in the game vj.
Banker (1981) notes, that an allocation scheme should not be sensitive to the way cost
centers are used or organized. For this kind of games the Shapley value is not the right
choice, because it does not satisfy the following axiom:
3In the case of using a subdomain (e. g. GN0 or GN0Q) for the TU-game (N, v) we require that the corre-
sponding split player game (N j, vj) is defined on the related subdomain (e. g. GNj0 or GN
j
0Q respectively).
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Player splitting, PS. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ GN, j ∈ N, and a corresponding split
player game (N j, vj) ∈ GNj to (N, v), we have
ϕi(N, v) = ϕi(N
j, vj) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
A suitable application of this axiom would be, that a player, who was participating in
an online game full-time, now is participating part-time under cover-names. The sum of
her time in part-time activities is equal to the original time in full-time activities. She
participates with the same productivity in all original coalitions, but now under all her
cover-names at the same time in total. In all other coalitions, she has only a pro forma
membership. This means that her marginal contribution to these coalitions is only her
singleton worth or, more specifically, all part-time players are weakly dependent. In such
a situation the payoff to the other players should not change.
Remark 6.2. Let N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ GN, j ∈ N, and (N j, vj) ∈ GNj a corresponding split
player game to (N, v). If ϕ is a TU-value that satisfies E and PS, then we have
ϕj(N, v) = ϕk(N
j, vj) + ϕ`(N
j, vj).
This remark is related to the amalgamating payoffs axiom by Radzik (2012) which is there
used to characterize the weighted Shapley values.
Remark 6.3. In Definition 6.1 the game (N, v) could also be considered as a corre-
sponding merged player game to (N j, vj) and so PS as a player merging axiom.
But we expressly point out that player j ∈ N and players k, ` ∈ N j can be completely inde-
pendent apart from the given properties in Definition 6.1 unlike the amalgamating payoffs
property by Radzik (2012).
It transpires that splitting fits best with the proportional Shapley value.
Proposition 6.4. Shp satisfies PS.
The following lemma shows dependence on symmetry for efficient values which satisfy
player splitting.
Lemma 6.5. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0 . If a TU-value ϕ satisfies E and PS, then ϕ
satisfies also S.
We have another interesting lemma which uses Lemma 6.5 in the proof.
Lemma 6.6. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0Q. If a TU-value ϕ satisfies E and PS, then ϕ
satisfies also P.
Thus, we obtain if the worths of all singletons are positive rational numbers, similar to
Young (1985a), the following corollary.
Corollary 6.7. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0Q. Shp is the unique TU-value that satisfies E,
PS, and WM/WCSE (equivalent by Proposition 4.1).
The proof follows immediately by Proposition 6.4 and Lemma 6.6 from Theorem 4.2. We
have another characterization with player splitting, similar to Shapley (1953b).
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Corollary 6.8. Let N ∈ N and v ∈ GN0Q. Shp is the unique TU-value that satisfies E,
D, PS, and WA.
The proof follows obviously by Proposition 6.4 and Lemma 6.6 from Theorem 3.3.
Remark 6.9. Lemma 6.6 holds for v ∈ GN0 if we require continuity of the TU-value in
v({i}) for all v ∈ GN0 and all i ∈ N in an additional axiom. So also Corollary 6.7 and
Corollary 6.8 are valid for v ∈ GN0 if there is in each case an additional continuity axiom.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown, that in games where the stand-alone worths of the singletons
are reasonable weights, the proportional Shapley value is a powerful tool to share benefits
of cooperation. The value convinces due to its applicable axioms, comparable with the
Shapley value. It is especially suitable for games where we want to ensure that the payoffs
to uninvolved players are not changing if another player is splitting into two new players
which together have the same input in the game as the single player before. The Shapley
value is not appropriate for such games and this could be one of the main reasons why
there is significant resistance to the use of the Shapley value in cost allocation in practice.
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8. Appendix
8.1. Additional lemmas and a remark, used in the proofs
Remark 8.1. We can consider the collection of all TU-games v ∈ GN, N ∈ N, as a vector
space R2N−1. Each game v is represented by a vector −→v ∈ R2N−1 where the entries in
the 2|N |−1 coordinates of the 2|N |−1 coalitions S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, get the worth v(S) of the
respective coalition S. Hence there exists for every game v a vector
−→
∆v ∈ R2N−1, which
corresponds to the vector −→v , where the entries of the coordinates get the dividends of the
respective coalitions. By statement (1) we obtain with v, v1, v2 ∈ GN, and for all S ⊆ N ,
−→
∆v =
−→
∆v1 +
−→
∆v2
⇔ ∆v(S) = ∆v1(S) + ∆v2(S)
⇔ v(S)−
∑
R(S
∆v(R) = v1(S)−
∑
R(S
∆v1(R) + v2(S)−
∑
R(S
∆v2(R)
⇔ v = v1 + v2.
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Lemma 8.2. Statement (4) in WCSE can be replaced equivalently by
∆v(S) =
{
∆w(R) + c, if S = R,
∆w(S), otherwise.
Proof. Let the notation and the preconditions as in WCSE. By (2), if v(S) = w(S)
for all S + R, we have ∆v(S) = ∆w(S) for all such S and vice versa. Hence, by (1),
v(R) = w(R) + c is equivalent to ∆v(R) = ∆w(R) + c. By induction on the size s := |S|
we show now v(S) = w(S) + c ⇔ ∆v(S) = ∆w(S) for all proper supersets S ) R.
Initialization: Let S ) R and s = |R|+ 1. R is the only proper subset of S where there
is a difference of the related dividends in both coalition functions and we obtain
v(S) = w(S) + c ⇔
(1)
v(S)−
∑
T(S
∆v(T ) = w(S) + c−
∑
T(S,
T 6=R
∆w(T )− (∆w(R) + c)
⇔
(1)
∆v(S) = ∆w(S).
Induction step: Assume equivalence holds for s′ = s − 1, |R| + 1 ≤ s′ ≤ n − 1 (IH).
Then, by (IH), R is again the only proper subset of S with not equal related dividends in
v and w. By (1), we get v(S) = w(S) + c ⇔ ∆v(S) = ∆w(S) as before and Lemma 8.2
is shown.
Lemma 8.3. (Casajus and Huettner, 2008). If i ∈ N and v, w ∈ GN, then MCvi (S) =
MCwi (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i} iff ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = ∆w(S ∪ {i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}.
8.2. Proofs
8.2.1. Proof of Lemma 3.2
Let i, j ∈ N and v ∈ GN. If S = ∅, we have v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}). We show by
induction on the size s := |S| of all coalitions S ⊆ N\{i, j}, S 6= ∅,
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}) ⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0.
Initialization: Let s = 1. For k ∈ {i, j} we have
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k})
⇔
(1)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) + ∆v(S) + ∆v({k}) = ∆v(S) + ∆v({k})
⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0.
Induction step: Assume that equivalence and equality in the first and last line of the
system above hold for all coalitions S ′ with s′ ≥ 1 (IH) and let s = s′ + 1 and k ∈ {i, j}.
We get
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k})
⇔
(1)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) +
∑
R((S∪{k})
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({k})
⇔
(IH)
∆v(S ∪ {k}) + ∆v({k}) +
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) =
∑
R⊆S
∆v(R) + ∆v({k})
⇔ ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0.
Thus equivalence is shown.
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8.2.2. Proof of Theorem 3.3
I. Existence: By Be´al et al. (2018), Shp satisfies E and D.
• P: Let v ∈ GN0 and i, j ∈ N such that i and j are weakly dependent in v. We have
Shpi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
k∈S v({k})
∆v(S) =
Lem.3.2
v({i}) +
∑
S⊆N,
{i,j}⊆S
v({i})∑
k∈S v({k})
∆v(S)
=
v({i})
v({j})v({j}) +
v({i})
v({j})
∑
S⊆N,
{i,j}⊆S
v({j})∑
k∈S v({k})
∆v(S)
=
Lem.3.2
v({i})
v({j})
∑
S⊆N,
S3j
v({j})∑
k∈S v({k})
∆v(S) =
v({i})
v({j})Sh
p
j(v).
•WA: Let v, w ∈ GN0 with w({i}) = c · v({i}) for all i ∈ N, c > 0. We have
Shpi (v) + Sh
p
i (w) =
(3)
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
w({i})∑
j∈S w({j})
∆w(S)
=
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
c · v({i})∑
j∈S c · v({j})
∆w(S)
=
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
[
∆v(S) + ∆w(S)
]
=
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
(1 + c)v({i})∑
j∈S(1 + c)v({j})
[
∆v(S) + ∆w(S)
]
=
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i}) + w({i})∑
j∈S
[
v({j}) + w({j})]∆v+w(S) = Shpi (v + w).
II. Uniqueness: Let N ∈ N , n := |N |, v ∈ GN0 , and ϕ a TU-value which satisfies all axioms
of Theorem 3.3. To prove uniqueness, we will show that ϕ equals Shp.
For n = 1, ϕ equals Shp by E.
Let now n ≥ 2. For each coalition S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, we define, corresponding to re-
mark 8.1, a TU-game vS ∈ GN0 through a vector −→vS ∈ R2n−1 by assigning the coordinates
of the related vector
−−→
∆vS ∈ R2n−1 in the entry of a coalition R ⊆ N, R 6= ∅, the dividend
∆vS(R) :=

v({j})
2n − 1 , if R = {j} for all j ∈ N,
∆v(S), if R = S, |S| ≥ 2,
0, otherwise.
Thus each vector −→vS ∈ R2n−1 gets in the coordinates of coalitions R ⊆ N, R 6= ∅, the
entry
vS(R) =

∆v(S) +
∑
j∈R
v({j})
2n − 1 , if R ⊇ S, |S| ≥ 2,∑
j∈R
v({j})
2n − 1 , otherwise.
(5)
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We have
−→
∆v =
∑
S⊆N,
S 6=∅
−−→
∆vS and so, by remark 8.1, v =
∑
S⊆N,
S 6=∅
vS.
By D we obtain
ϕi(vS) =

vS({i}) = v({i})
2n − 1 for all i ∈ N and |S| = 1, and
vS({i}) = v({i})
2n − 1 for all i ∈ N, i /∈ S, |S| ≥ 2.
(6)
By Lemma 3.2, all players i ∈ S, |S| ≥ 2, are pairwise weakly dependent in vS. We get
for an arbitrary i ∈ S, |S| ≥ 2, and by vS(N) =
(5)
∆v(S) +
∑
j∈N
v({j})
2n − 1
∑
j∈S ϕj(vS) =
(P)
∑
j∈S
vS({j})
vS({i})ϕi(vS) =
∑
j∈S
v({j})
v({i})ϕi(vS)
=
(E)
vS(N)−
∑
j∈N\S
ϕj(vS) =
(6)
∆v(S) +
∑
j∈S
v({j})
2n − 1
⇔ ϕi(vS) = v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) +
v({i})
2n − 1 . (7)
So we have by (3), (6) and (7) for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅,
ϕi(vS) = Sh
p
i (vS) for all i ∈ N.
Shp and ϕ satisfy WA. It follows
ϕi(v) = Sh
p
i (v) for all i ∈ N
and uniqueness is shown.
8.2.3. Proof of Proposition 4.1
⇒: We show WM implies WCSE: Let v and w two TU-games satisfying the hypotheses
of WCSE, i. e. for a coalition R ⊆ N, |R| ≥ 2, c ∈ R, we have
v(S) =
{
w(S) + c, if S ⊇ R,
w(S), if S + R.
Let ϕ be a TU-value which obeys WM. By Lemma 8.2, we have
∆v(S) =
{
∆w(R) + c, if S = R,
∆w(S), otherwise.
Thus, we have ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = ∆w(S ∪ {i}) for all i ∈ N\R and S ⊆ N\{i}. By Lemma
8.3 follows MCvi (S) = MC
w
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}. So we can use WM and get ϕi(v) =
ϕi(w) for all i ∈ N\R and WCSE is satisfied.
⇐: We show WCSE implies WM: Let N ∈ N , i ∈ N, v, w ∈ GN two coalition functions
satisfying the hypothesis of WM, i. e. MCvi (S) = MC
w
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i} and
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w({k}) = v({k}) for all k ∈ N and ϕ a value satisfying WCSE. Then, by Lemma 8.3,
we have ∆v(T ) = ∆w(T ) for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i. Let R = {Rj ⊆ N : ∆v(Rj) 6= ∆w(Rj)}
an indexed set of all subsets of N with different dividends in v and w, 1 ≤ j ≤ |R|. We
inductively define a sequence of coalition functions wj, 0 ≤ j ≤ |R|, by wj := w if j = 0,
and, if 1 ≤ j ≤ |R|,
∆wj(S) :=
{
∆wj−1(Rj) +
[
∆v(Rj)−∆wj−1(Rj)
]
, if S = Rj,
∆wj−1(S), if S ⊆ N, S 6= Rj.
Then we have w|R| = v and, by Lemma 8.2 and WCSE, we get ϕi(wj) = ϕi(wj−1) for all
j, 1 ≤ j ≤ |R|, and therefore ϕi(v) = ϕi(w) and WM is satisfied.
8.2.4. Proof of Theorem 4.2
I. Existence: By Theorem 3.3, Shp satisfies E and P.
•WCSE: By Lemma 8.2, we have for v and a coalition R from WCSE
∆v(S) =
{
∆w(R) + c, if S = R,
∆w(S), otherwise.
Thus, we obtain for all i ∈ N\R
Shpi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i
w({i})∑
j∈S w({j})
∆w(S) = Sh
p
i (w).
II. Uniqueness: Let N ∈ N , n := |N |, v ∈ GN0 , and ϕ a TU-value which satisfies all
axioms of Theorem 4.2. We will show that ϕ satisfies eq. (3).
For n = 1, eq. (3) is satisfied by E.
Let n ≥ 2. We use an induction on the size r := |{R ⊆ N : R is active in v and
|R| ≥ 2}|.
Initialization: Let r = 0. By Lemma 3.2, all players i, j ∈ N are pairwise weakly
dependent in v. We get for an arbitrary i ∈ N∑
j∈N
ϕj(v) =
(P)
∑
j∈N
v({j})
v({i})ϕi(v) =(E) v(N).
With v(N) =
∑
j∈N v({j}) follows ϕi(v) = v({i}) and eq. (3) holds to ϕ if r = 0.
Induction step: Assume that eq. (3) holds to ϕ if r ≥ 0, r arbitrary (IH), and let
exactly r + 1 coalitions Qk ⊆ N, |Qk| ≥ 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ r + 1, active in v. Let Q be the
intersection of all such coalitions Qk
Q =
⋂
1≤k≤r+1
Qk.
We distinguish two cases: (a) i ∈ N\Q and (b) i ∈ Q.
(a) Each player i ∈ N\Q is a member of at most r active coalitions Qk, |Qk| ≥ 2, and
v gets at least one active coalition Ri, |Ri| ≥ 2, i /∈ Ri. Hence exists a coalition function
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wi ∈ GN0 where all coalitions get the same dividend in wi as in v, except the coalition Ri
which gets the dividend ∆wi(Ri) = 0, and there is existing a scalar c ∈ R, c 6= 0, with
∆v(S) =
{
∆wi(Ri) + c, if S = Ri,
∆wi(S), otherwise.
By Lemma 8.2 and WCSE, we get ϕi(v) = ϕi(wi) with i ∈ N\Ri and because there
exists for all i ∈ N\Q a such Ri, we get ϕi(v) = ϕi(wi) for all i ∈ N\Q. All coalition
functions wi get at most r active coalitions with at least two players and eq. (3) follows
by (IH). Thus, we have
ϕi(v) = Sh
p
i (v) for all i ∈ N\Q. (8)
(b) If Q = {i}, we get, by E of ϕ and Shp and case (a), ϕi(v) = Shpi (v). If |Q| ≥ 2, each
player j ∈ Q is a member of all r + 1 active coalitions Qk ⊆ N, |Qk| ≥ 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ r + 1,
and therefore, by Lemma 3.2, all players j ∈ Q are weakly dependent. By P and E of ϕ
and Shp, we get for an arbitrary i ∈ Q∑
j∈Q
ϕj(v) =
(P)
∑
j∈Q
v({j})
v({i})ϕi(v) =(E)
(8)
v(N)−
∑
j∈N\Q
Shpj(v) =
(E)
∑
j∈Q
Shpj(v)
=
(P)
∑
j∈Q
v({j})
v({i})Sh
p
i (v) ⇔ ϕi(v) = Shpi (v)
and together with I. the proof is complete.
8.2.5. Proof of Proposition 6.4
Let (N, v) ∈ GN0 , j ∈ N, and (N j, vj) ∈ GNj0 a corresponding split player game to (N, v).
We point out that we have for all S ⊆ N\{j}, S 6= ∅, ∆vj(S) = ∆v(S), ∆vj(S ∪ {k, l}) =
∆v(S ∪ {j}), and ∆vj(S ∪ {k}) = ∆vj(S ∪ {`}) = 0. Then we get for all i ∈ N\{j}
Shpi (N, v) =
∑
R⊆N,
R3i
v({i})∑
m∈R v({m})
∆v(R)
=
∑
S⊆N\{j},
S3i
v({i})∑
m∈S v({m})
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N\{j},
S3i
v({i})∑
m∈S∪{j} v({m})
∆v(S ∪ {j})
=
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`},
S3i
vj({i})∑
m∈S v
j({m})∆vj(S)
+
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`},
S3i
vj({i})∑
m∈S∪{k,`} v
j({m})∆vj(S ∪ {k, `})
=
∑
R⊆Nj,
R3i
vj({i})∑
m∈R v
j({m})∆vj(R) = Sh
p
i (N
j, vj).
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8.2.6. Proof of Lemma 6.5
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n}, |N | ≥ 2, v ∈ GN0 , ϕ a TU-value which satisfies E and PS for all
v ∈ GN0 , and w.l.o.g., player 1 and player 2 be symmetric in v. If we split player 1 according
to PS into two new players, player n+ 1 and player n+ 2, N1 = {2, 3, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2},
we have
ϕ2(N
1, v1) = ϕ2(N, v), (9)
and, if we split player 2 according to PS into the same players as before, player n+ 1 and
player n+ 2, instead, N2 = {1, 3, 4, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2}, we have
ϕ1(N
2, v2) = ϕ1(N, v), (10)
where we choose v2({n+ 1}) := v1({n+ 1}) and v2({n+ 2}) := v1({n+ 2}).
In the same manner we split now in the game (N1, v1) player 2 into two new players,
player n+ 3 and player n+ 4, and analogous in the game (N2, v2) player 1 into the same
players as before, player n+3 and player n+4, and choose v2
1
({n+3}) := v12({n+3}) and
v2
1
({n+ 4}) := v12({n+ 4}). We have N12 = N21 = {3, 4, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2, n+ 3, n+ 4}
and v1
2
= v2
1
and get by E, according to remark 6.2,
ϕn+3
(
N1
2
, v1
2
)
+ ϕn+4
(
N1
2
, v1
2
)
= ϕ2(N
1, v1) =
(9)
ϕ2(N, v),
ϕn+3
(
N2
1
, v2
1
)
+ ϕn+4
(
N2
1
, v2
1
)
= ϕ1(N
2, v2) =
(10)
ϕ1(N, v).
Hence, we have ϕ1(N, v) = ϕ2(N, v) and S is shown.
8.2.7. Proof of Lemma 6.6
Let N ∈ N , |N | ≥ 2, v ∈ GN0Q a TU-game, and, w.l.o.g., player i, j ∈ N weakly dependent
in v. Furthermore, let ϕ a TU-value which satisfies E and PS for all v ∈ GN0Q and therefore,
by Lemma 6.5, also S. Due to v({i}), v({j}) ∈ Q\{0}, the worths of the singletons
v({k}), k ∈ {i, j}, can be written as a fraction. We distinguish two cases: (a) v({k}) > 0
and (b) v({k}) < 0.
(a) We have
v({k}) = pk
qk
with pk, qk ∈ N.
We choose a main denominator q of these two fractions by q := qiqj. With zi := piqj and
zj := pjqi, we get
v({i}) = zi
q
and v({j}) = zj
q
. (11)
Now we define a player set N ′ and a coalition function v′ by ”splitting” each player
k ∈ {i, j} into zk players k1 to kzk such that we have N ′ = (N\{i, j}) ∪ {im : 1 ≤ m ≤
zi} ∪ {jm : 1 ≤ m ≤ zj}. Each player km ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}), 1 ≤ m ≤ zk, get a singleton
worth v′({km}) = 1q for k ∈ {i, j}, synonymous with
v′({`}) = 1
q
for all ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}),
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where |N ′\(N\{i, j})| = zi + zj and v({k}) =
∑
1≤m≤zk v
′({km}), k ∈ {i, j}. We define
v′(R′) := v(R) for all R′ = R\{i, j}∪N ′\(N\{i, j}), R ⊆ N, {i, j} ⊆ R, and v′(S) := v(S)
for all S ⊆ N ′ with S ⊆ N . All other coalitions T ⊆ N ′ are defined as not active in v′.
Applying PS (repeatedly) to v, ϕ and the two players i, j ∈ N we can get the coalition
function v′ defined just before and, by remark 6.2, we have
ϕk(N, v) =
∑
1≤m≤zk
ϕkm(N
′, v′) for k ∈ {i, j}. (12)
All players ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}) are symmetric in v′. Hence follows by S
ϕ`(N
′, v′) =
ϕi(N, v) + ϕj(N, v)
zi + zj
for all ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}).
We get
ϕk(N, v) =
(12)
∑
1≤m≤zk
ϕkm(N
′, v′) =
zk
zi + zj
[
ϕi(N, v) + ϕj(N, v)
]
for k ∈ {i, j}.
It follows
ϕi(N, v) =
zi
zj
ϕj(N, v) =
(11)
v({i})
v({j})ϕj(N, v)
and P is shown.
(b) We have
v({k}) = pk
qk
with (−pk), qk ∈ N.
We choose a main denominator q of these two fractions by q := −qiqj. With zi := −piqj
and zj := −pjqi, we get
v({i}) = zi
q
and v({j}) = zj
q
.
The remaining part of the proof equals the related part in case (a).
8.3. Logical independence
Finally, we want to show the independence of the axioms used in the characterizations.
Remark 8.4. Let v ∈ GN0 , N ∈ N . The axioms in Theorem 3.3/Corollary 6.8 are logi-
cally independent:
• E: The TU-value ϕ defined by
ϕi(v) = v({i}) + 2 ·
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, S 6={i}
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N
satisfies D, P/PS, and WA but not E.
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• D: The proportional rule pi (Moriarity, 1975), given by
pii(v) =
v({i})∑
j∈N v({j})
v(N) for all i ∈ N (13)
satisfies E, P/PS, and WA but not D.
• P/PS: Sh satisfies E, D, and WA but not P/PS.
• WA: The TU-value ϕ defined for all i ∈ N by
ϕi(v) =

v({i}), if i is a dummy player,
v({i})∑
j∈N,
j is no dummy
v({j})
[
v(N)−∑ j∈N,
j is a dummy
v({j})
]
, otherwise,
satisfies E, D, and P/PS but not WA.
Remark 8.5. Let v ∈ GN0 , N ∈ N . The axioms in Theorem 4.2/Corollary 6.7 are logi-
cally independent:
• E: The TU-value ϕ defined for all i ∈ N by
ϕi(v) =
{
0, if |N | = 1,
Shpi (v), else,
satisfies P/PS and WCSE but not E.
• P/PS: Sh satisfies E and WCSE but not P/PS.
• WCSE: The proportional rule pi (eq. (13)) satisfies E and P/PS but not WCSE.
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